What's wrong with politics ?

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  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Bishops Finger: It's highly unlikely, however, that a majority of voters in southern Scotland would want to stay in English Brexshitland.

    But who knows?

    Who, indeed?!

    It might, however, be instructive to note the following preferences of opposition to Scottish separatism from the UK in 2014 and to staying within the EU in 2016 in southern Scotland.

    2014 Referendum: Dumfries and Galloway (65.7% No); Scottish Borders (66.5% No); Edinburgh (61.1% No); East Lothian (61.7% No). All Scotland 55.3% No to leaving the UK.

    2014 Referendum: Dumfries and Galloway (46.9% Leave EU); Scottish Borders (41.5% Leave EU); Edinburgh ( Leave 25.6% EU); East Lothian (35.4% Leave EU). All Scotland 38.0% Leave EU.

    ISTM that even under the present seemingly favourable (though marginally so) preference for Scottish independence at the present time that southern Scotland would still wish to remain in the United Kingdom. If, however, it is considered that opposition to leaving the EU is a major factor then it might be argued that Edinburgh and East Lothian might now wish to join an independent Scotland. Personally, I would doubt it. It has to be remembered that financial services, the strongest part of the Scottish economy, centred in Edinburgh, is linked to the City of London.

    It might also be of interest to note that Orkney voted 67.2% and Shetland voted 63.7% No to Scottish independence; and Orkney 36.8% and Shetland 43.5% to leave the EU. Shetland could prove interesting!

    I'd like to see the figures for Berwick-on-Tweed and its surrounding region in England on the prospect of joining an independent Scotland. A revival of Northumbria?
  • Kwesi wrote: »
    My guess is that an independent Scotland would find it impossible to sustain the welfare state its proponents desire and assume.

    I doubt that an independent Scotland would manage to maintain its current level of welfare state, never mind the level some of its proponents suggest.

    I'm still in favour of Scottish independence of course, but that's because I believe self-determination is more important than any economic consequences thereof.

    The sort of self determination which will require the EU to bail them out.
  • RussRuss Shipmate
    JonahMan wrote: »
    Or equally, Berwick-upon-Tweed might well prefer to become part of a new independent Scotland rather than being part of England. Should they be allowed to do do?

    Should every farmer with land that abuts the river Tweed be individually given the choice as to which side of the border they want to be ?
  • BroJamesBroJames Purgatory Host, 8th Day Host
    Take a vote of those within the 1237 border, or if there are a number further south, then use the Tweed catchment and take a vote within that area.
  • Aberdeen also voted in favour of Scotland staying in the UK. Should there be a small enclave there too, with roast beef and warm beer being airlifted in through a hostile surrounding territory?
  • orfeoorfeo Shipmate
    Oh look, how about we just create millions of one-person microstates, then we can watch most of them either economically fail or just have their populations wiped out by wars with the other countries, and then eventually there'll be a small number of isolated rulers of sizable estates who never ever have to deal with anyone they don't agree 100% with except by muting them on Zoom.

    Assuming the owners of Zoom have survived the process of course.
  • RussRuss Shipmate
    edited October 2020
    BroJames wrote: »
    Take a vote of those within the 1237 border, or if there are a number further south, then use the Tweed catchment and take a vote within that area.

    Seems like as long as it's a democratic vote (with the implication that the minority have to bow to the will of the majority, so that the individuals on the losing side have their nationality taken from them without their individual consent) then everyone thinks this is a good idea. (And maybe even natural justice for those who believe in such a thing).

    But when it's proposed that individual landowners can decide (for that subset whose land is on the current border and therefore for whom either option is workable), then nobody thinks that's a good idea.

    Even though choices at individual level have the same upside, without the downside of coercion of the minority by the majority.

    Am I alone in finding this curious ?

    (Cross-posted with orfeo, who seems to be arguing for limits to the right of self-determination)
  • BroJamesBroJames Purgatory Host, 8th Day Host
    If an individual landowner makes that decision, it doesn’t have an impact only on that landowner, but also on their neighbours. There are practical effects of geography and geographical proximity.
  • orfeoorfeo Shipmate
    edited October 2020
    Russ wrote: »
    BroJames wrote: »
    Take a vote of those within the 1237 border, or if there are a number further south, then use the Tweed catchment and take a vote within that area.

    Seems like as long as it's a democratic vote (with the implication that the minority have to bow to the will of the majority, so that the individuals on the losing side have their nationality taken from them without their individual consent) then everyone thinks this is a good idea. (And maybe even natural justice for those who believe in such a thing).

    But when it's proposed that individual landowners can decide (for that subset whose land is on the current border and therefore for whom either option is workable), then nobody thinks that's a good idea.

    Even though choices at individual level have the same upside, without the downside of coercion of the minority by the majority.

    Am I alone in finding this curious ?

    (Cross-posted with orfeo, who seems to be arguing for limits to the right of self-determination)

    Of course I'm arguing for the limits. Because I'm pointing out logically where it takes you.

    We do not live in a system of endless self-determination, though occasionally when I'm drafting laws I get bizarre instructions that seem to think that we do, and that people ought only to be bound by decisions they've explicitly agree to.

    Tell me, at what point did someone come and check with you that you were happy with the road rules? No. You're told what the rules are, and you get a license, and if you don't follow the rules then you can lose that license. Sure, you can argue in favour of a rule change, but in the meantime you're stuck with the rules as they are.

    Endless self-determination is basically the Thatcherite position of claiming there's no such thing as society. Which is bollocks. Society is exactly what got you into the situation where you're comfortable enough to sit around believing that the whole universe revolves around you as an individual.

    It's perfectly fine to consult affected communities, but if you keep insisting on breaking everything down to the point where no-one ever has to live with a situation not to their personal liking, then the whole rationale for having these forms of government breaks down anyway.

    Same as the rationale for any other kind of structure beyond individuals all doing their own thing, in business or anywhere else. We've had consultation on things at work where I've been in the minority. So I suck it up and follow the policy. Years ago, I remember a colleague who basically declared that he was going to draft something the way he wanted to in spite of the decision to draft it another way, and I had to resist the urge to slap him.

    The claim that individual choice has an upside without a downside is just complete fanciful nonsense. No man is an island. These days not even an island country is really an island, despite Brexit.

    If you truly believe that it's wrong to have any kind of coercion of one person to act against their own desires, then even families become completely impossible. I mean, I live alone, and even I can understand that certain things about life would be fundamentally different in a household with more than 1 person. And even as it is I have to sometimes consider, as a decent civil human being, interactions with my neighbours.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Orfeo, I completely agree with your argument regarding the absurdity of endless reductionism in these matters, and that there has to be a point where a minority just has to suck it up. That is why in a partitioned Scotland Aberdonian unionists would just have to put up with a decision make by the central belt. The case for southern Scotland remaining in the United Kingdom is one that recognises more than six in ten have expressed a will not to secede, and given its geographical position in relation to the rest of the UK there seems no reason why that desire could not be reasonably and practically recognised within the context of democratic self-determination.
  • orfeoorfeo Shipmate
    edited October 2020
    You mention context?

    The case for southern Scotland remaining in the UK is one based on a vote that happened when the UK were making all sorts of promises about how an independent Scotland would never get to be in the EU. Ask again.

    How they felt about seceding from a UK that was in the EU is frankly no longer relevant. Because the English have taken away the option that southern Scotland was voting for. That vote is fundamentally useless as evidence, and I'm surprised, @Kwesi, at your eagerness to cite it.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Orfeo, I think it not unreasonable that the question should be asked again, and you will note that I indicated that southern Scotland also voted to remain within the EU, very strongly so in Edinburgh. The point I was trying to make was that if an area contiguous with England were to choose to remain in the UK in some future referendum consultation, there is no democratic reason why its wishes could not be met.

  • But at the moment Southern Scotland is recognised as being part of Scotland, so unless you start off by asking these regions if they want to continue to be in Scotland or become part of England prior to IndyRef2, surely the vote is binding on them. In exactly the same way that Brexit applied to Scotland, Wales and N.Ireland even though they voted the other way. The whole point of democracy is that decisions are made collectively on an agreed basis and that they apply to everyone.
  • We were discussing a erlated issue yesterday, and found the arguments that we (UK) would regain sovereignty on Brexit stupid, since the individual voter never had it anyway. Being at heart anarcho-syndicalists, we favour the individual sovereignty option, but at least we know we'll never have it.
  • RussRuss Shipmate
    If you truly believe that it's wrong to have any kind of coercion of one person to act against their own desires, then even families become completely impossible. I mean, I live alone, and even I can understand that certain things about life would be fundamentally different in a household with more than 1 person. And even as it is I have to sometimes consider, as a decent civil human being, interactions with my neighbours.

    If you truly believe in a "doing as you would be done by" notion of morality, then I struggle to see how you can avoid thinking that coercion is morally bad. Who wants to be coerced ?

    Sure, forming a household with another person means accepting that there will be some give-and-take and you won't always get your own way. That's not an argument for coercion; it's an argument that cohabitation should (where practical) be voluntary (i.e. by consent).

    Sure, there are practical limits to how much self-determination can be implemented. That's not an argument in principle against letting everyone make their own choices (individually or collectively) when it is practical to do so.

    And I don't see any argument here why self-determination is good when it is collective but bad when it is individual.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    JonahMan: But at the moment Southern Scotland is recognised as being part of Scotland

    It is also part of a state, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
    JonahMan:....... so unless you start off by asking these regions if they want to continue to be in Scotland or become part of England prior to IndyRef2, surely the vote is binding on them.
    Why should it have to become part of England? Like Northern Ireland it would remain part of the existing state. I agree with you, however, that the option of remaining or not should be discussed and the terms of any process understood prior to any referendum or series of referendums.

  • DafydDafyd Shipmate
    Originally the Lothians were part of the Kingdom of Northumbria. The Scots sneakily conquered them while the Northumbrians were busy with the Vikings or the Mercians or somebody.

    I have not tried the theory that everywhere south of the neck between the Forth and the Kelvin is rightfully part of Englsnd on a Scot.
  • Dafyd wrote: »
    Originally the Lothians were part of the Kingdom of Northumbria. The Scots sneakily conquered them while the Northumbrians were busy with the Vikings or the Mercians or somebody.

    I have not tried the theory that everywhere south of the neck between the Forth and the Kelvin is rightfully part of Englsnd on a Scot.

    I think if you try that one we summon Duke Franz of Bavaria to claim his crown.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    I seem to think the Scots came from Ireland in the 5th Century BC. If you go back far enough you end up with Adam and Eve.
  • orfeoorfeo Shipmate
    Russ wrote: »
    If you truly believe that it's wrong to have any kind of coercion of one person to act against their own desires, then even families become completely impossible. I mean, I live alone, and even I can understand that certain things about life would be fundamentally different in a household with more than 1 person. And even as it is I have to sometimes consider, as a decent civil human being, interactions with my neighbours.

    If you truly believe in a "doing as you would be done by" notion of morality, then I struggle to see how you can avoid thinking that coercion is morally bad. Who wants to be coerced ?

    Sure, forming a household with another person means accepting that there will be some give-and-take and you won't always get your own way. That's not an argument for coercion; it's an argument that cohabitation should (where practical) be voluntary (i.e. by consent).

    Sure, there are practical limits to how much self-determination can be implemented. That's not an argument in principle against letting everyone make their own choices (individually or collectively) when it is practical to do so.

    And I don't see any argument here why self-determination is good when it is collective but bad when it is individual.

    The argument lies in the inherent contradictions of what you just said. And in the "where practical" in parentheses. Everyone up and leaving a group when they feel like it is not practical. That was my initial point. An endless collection of single-person microstates simply isn't viable. Allowing little children to up and leave their parents when they don't get their way isn't viable.

    Of course I don't think coercion is morally bad. I write laws for a living.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Orfeo: Of course I don't think coercion is morally bad. I write laws for a living.

    I agree. I think the problem lies with Russ' emphasis on the importance of morality as an act of free will. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, for him to see an action or inaction that is coerced as moral. Personally, I don't care if individuals refrain from murder or pay their taxes to support beneficial public services willingly or unwillingly, because a liberal democracy governed by the rule of law is a good thing. It's not a question of individual morality.

    Perhaps I've got Russ wrong and he can put me right.
  • RussRuss Shipmate
    Kwesi wrote: »
    I think the problem lies with Russ' emphasis on the importance of morality as an act of free will. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, for him to see an action or inaction that is coerced as moral.
    I'm not talking about whether the act of complying or not complying with a law is moral. I'm talking about whether the act of coercing someone can be moral, given a "Golden Rule" approach to morality which considers it wrong to do unto others that which you would not wish to have done unto you.

    If in contrast you have a utilitarian approach to morality, you'll have no problem coercing everyone into working for what you think constitutes the best outcome.
    a liberal democracy governed by the rule of law is a good thing.

    I agree. And agreeing, consent to living under a rule of law. With the minimum of coercion that that necessarily entails.

    But still cannot help but think that, where within that framework there is a choice between a more-coercive and a less-coercive option, that the less-coercive option is the moral choice.

    (Choice implying that both are practical options).

    Is that the difference between a liberal democracy and an illiberal one ?




  • Russ wrote: »
    I'm not talking about whether the act of complying or not complying with a law is moral. I'm talking about whether the act of coercing someone can be moral, given a "Golden Rule" approach to morality which considers it wrong to do unto others that which you would not wish to have done unto you.

    If in contrast you have a utilitarian approach to morality, you'll have no problem coercing everyone into working for what you think constitutes the best outcome.
    a liberal democracy governed by the rule of law is a good thing.

    I agree. And agreeing, consent to living under a rule of law. With the minimum of coercion that that necessarily entails.

    There's a lot of weaseling here. First the assertion that coercion is immoral. Then the reverse to claiming that coercion can be moral if it's the minimum necessary. Which sounds a lot like claiming that coercion is wrong except for when I want it to happen, at which point it's okay and minimal.

    Does this mean that anyone living within a state takes "a utilitarian approach to morality", since states are, by definition, coercive entities? And if everyone is a utilitarian, doesn't the term lose all meaning?
  • JonahMan wrote: »
    But at the moment Southern Scotland is recognised as being part of Scotland, so unless you start off by asking these regions if they want to continue to be in Scotland or become part of England prior to IndyRef2, surely the vote is binding on them.

    But why should that be the choice of referendum question? It's a choice, of course, but if you're serious about democracy, you should be seeking the question that will most satisfy the people.

    Of course there's an existing border between Scotland and England, but there's no a priori reason why a Scotland that seeks independence has to be the same as the current Scotland - it would be perfectly reasonable for people to choose to move the border so that the region on one side of the border joined up with the country on the other.

    So if, for example, the borders have a rather different general public opinion than the north of Scotland, it's sensible to investigate what the right question might be.

    It could certainly be that South Scotland might prefer to remain as Scotland-in-the-UK, at which point we'd need to consider whether South Scotland was a viable political entity within the UK. If the only part of Scotland that wanted to remain in the UK was the Borders, for example, it probably wouldn't have enough population to warrant its separate legal and education systems. So realistically, its preferred option wouldn't be viable, but either the option "join the rest of Scotland in independence" or "join England" would be viable.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Russ: I'm talking about whether the act of coercing someone can be moral, given a "Golden Rule" approach to morality which considers it wrong to do unto others that which you would not wish to have done unto you.

    Contract theorists would argue that by contracting to live under a particular regime one accepts the terms under which common decisions will be made and enforced. In so doing an individual agrees to be coerced into obeying laws that are enacted within terms of the contract i.e. the constitution to which he/she has assented. It follows, of course, that the rulers are legitimately permitted to exercise coercion within the terms of the contract. How that compromises the golden rule I fail to see.
  • RussRuss Shipmate
    So the state can morally do whatever it's constitution permits ? On the basis that everyone is supposed to have consented to live in such a state ? So legal is moral ?

    With no intermediate possibility between giving the state carte blanche to do as it pleases and being an outlaw in the wilderness ?
  • Russ wrote: »
    So the state can morally do whatever it's constitution permits ? On the basis that everyone is supposed to have consented to live in such a state ? So legal is moral ?

    With no intermediate possibility between giving the state carte blanche to do as it pleases and being an outlaw in the wilderness ?

    That's pretty much your argument here.
    Russ wrote: »
    Kwesi wrote: »
    Personally, I don't care if individuals refrain from murder or pay their taxes to support beneficial public services willingly or unwillingly, because a liberal democracy governed by the rule of law is a good thing.

    I agree. And agreeing, consent to living under a rule of law. With the minimum of coercion that that necessarily entails.

    Can you make up your mind whether you're for or against the rule of law?
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Russ So the state can morally do whatever it's constitution permits ? On the basis that everyone is supposed to have consented to live in such a state ? So legal is moral ?

    I'm not so hung up on morality as you are, Russ, but given that an individual has willingly consented to live under the terms of a particular state it seems to me he/she is morally obligated to keep his/her promise to accept its constitutional authority, among which is the constitutional exercise of coercion, however defined. As to the link between legal and moral, whatever I might think about the morality of laws passed I think that the principle of the rule of law is a good one to live by even if I consider some of the laws to be immoral.

  • Dave WDave W Shipmate
    "Willingly consented"? "His/her promise"? What consent, what promise?
  • Well we tend to use existing historical borders as the basis on which to conduct politics. Occasionally these change by choice or force of course. I doubt that there is any significant support for the Borders to join England. And if The Borders were allowed to remain as rScotland in the UK, would the same offer be extended to Aberdeen? If not, why not - just an accident of proximity defines it?

    So, if you want to offer a binary choice in a future independence referendum it can only be between "Scotland remains in the UK" and "Scotland (with the existing boundaries) becomes a separate nation". Which is what I've said and what you (LC) has agreed with, I think.

    Of course at some point if the Borders wants decides to have it's own IndyRef and rejoin rUK, or even become a very small nation state by itself, it should be allowed to... or should it? The People's Republic of Yorkshire could also beckon in this scenario!

    On a more general note, what's the smallest unit of land area/population that should be allowed to decide its own allegiance? It's an interesting question, where practical considerations will collide, I think, with moral, legal and historical issues.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    In contract theory individuals in a state of nature agree to form a political society by negotiating a constitution to which they give their assent i.e. promise to adhere. Part of that agreement involves the circumstances under which the executive has the power to exercise coercion. Russ argues that the exercise of coercion may be legally but not morally justified. I'm arguing that in agreeing to a particular constitutional settlement an individual is promising to accept the right of the executive to coerce him/her within the terms of the covenant, and that the keeping of promises is a moral virtue.
  • Dave WDave W Shipmate
    Kwesi wrote: »
    In contract theory individuals in a state of nature agree to form a political society by negotiating a constitution to which they give their assent i.e. promise to adhere. Part of that agreement involves the circumstances under which the executive has the power to exercise coercion.
    Do you have a reference for any of this? From what little I know about contract law, this kind of Rousseauian fantasy couldn't possibly form the basis of an enforceable contract.

    When were you ever in a "state of nature," negotiating a constitution? I know I never promised to accept the right of the executive to coerce me, and I resent the implication that I did.
  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Dave W: Do you have a reference for any of this? From what little I know about contract law, this kind of Rousseauian fantasy couldn't possibly form the basis of an enforceable contract.

    A good start would be Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, and John Locke's Two Treatises on Government. Alternatively, numerous text-books on introduction to political philosophy cover contract theories.
    Dave W: When were you ever in a "state of nature," negotiating a constitution?

    I know I never promised to accept the right of the executive to coerce me, and I resent the implication that I did.

    Very fair questions. Such negotiations are the subject of constitutional conventions, which only take place in exceptional circumstances and seemingly bind future generations. You are also right to question the historicity of states of nature, especially as their character vary from one philosopher to another, depending on their purpose. Supporters of contract theories would probably suggest that functioning liberal democracies are in a constant state of constitutional bargaining and their functioning rests on implicit consent, including the right of the government to coerce citizens into obeying the law- it's all part of the package.
  • Dave WDave W Shipmate
    Kwesi wrote: »
    Dave W: Do you have a reference for any of this? From what little I know about contract law, this kind of Rousseauian fantasy couldn't possibly form the basis of an enforceable contract.
    A good start would be Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, and John Locke's Two Treatises on Government. Alternatively, numerous text-books on introduction to political philosophy cover contract theories.
    Oh, you really did mean 17th century social contract theory. I thought perhaps you were referring to something more ... contemporary.
    Dave W: When were you ever in a "state of nature," negotiating a constitution?

    I know I never promised to accept the right of the executive to coerce me, and I resent the implication that I did.

    Very fair questions.
    Then please feel free to go ahead and answer it - for yourself, not in terms of what "supporters of contract theories would probably" do. How and when did you give consent to be coerced in the form of a promise you are morally obliged to keep?
  • orfeoorfeo Shipmate
    edited October 2020
    Russ wrote: »
    So the state can morally do whatever it's constitution permits ? On the basis that everyone is supposed to have consented to live in such a state ? So legal is moral ?

    With no intermediate possibility between giving the state carte blanche to do as it pleases and being an outlaw in the wilderness ?

    It's you who doesn't live in a world of intermediate possibilities. Not everyone else in the thread. YOU are the one who tried to take the position that coercion was morally bad. Whereupon I said I didn't agree, given that I operate in a field of writing laws, which are inherently coercive.

    Whereupon you started trying to say, oh right, I'm fine with rule of law. With the "minimum" of coercion that "necessarily" entails.

    So you do believe in coercion after all.

    It's only once you admit that you believe in coercion that we get into the question as to how much coercion is the right level of coercion in a given situation. A conversation I would have quite happily engaged in days ago. But here's the thing, Russ: you weren't fucking ready for such a conversation.

    I'm still not convinced you're ready to for such a conversation. Straight away, as soon as anyone talks about coercion, you've reverted a childish all-or-nothing characterisation of the argument.

    We'll talk about intermediate possibility when you start allowing for them. If you're going to constantly wail about coercion in general, any discussion about which situations require what sort of coercion is simply impossible.

    And this IS one of the basic policy, political questions. How to use the power the state has, and how much of it to use. But first you've got to accept the basic premise that the state has these powers. And not just when you like them being wielded against other people.
  • DafydDafyd Shipmate
    Dave W wrote: »
    Kwesi wrote: »
    A good start would be Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, and John Locke's Two Treatises on Government. Alternatively, numerous text-books on introduction to political philosophy cover contract theories.
    Oh, you really did mean 17th century social contract theory. I thought perhaps you were referring to something more ... contemporary.
    Just because it's 17th century doesn't mean it's been superseded. (Newton has been expanded but not superseded.)
    Modern Western political philosophy is a set of footnotes to Hobbes and Locke (or to Hobbes: Locke is just the most eminent footnote). In so far as there is an alternative it goes even further back to Aristotle or Plato.

    One can implicitly assume an obligation by acting as if you accept it. (I assume there is some body of legal rulings as to what it is reasonable to take as implicit acceptance.)
    Locke argues that you accept an obligation to obey the government by taking advantage of its services (in particular, by using roads or being defended from violence). Locke argues that such an obligation can only go so far. The government can't presume implicit consent to things to which it would be unreasonable to consent to or which one would only consent to under duress. Locke was, unlike Hobbes, arguing that revolution was sometimes justifiable.
    (There is of course a body of philosophical debate about this point.)
  • DafydDafyd Shipmate
    Crœsos wrote: »
    First the assertion that coercion is immoral. Then the reverse to claiming that coercion can be moral if it's the minimum necessary. Which sounds a lot like claiming that coercion is wrong except for when I want it to happen, at which point it's okay and minimal.
    I think it's inherent in the attempt to get a primacy of consent model out of the Golden Rule. Essentially, if Russ would be happy doing something anyway, then he wouldn't mind being coerced into doing it, so it's ok for other people to be coerced into doing it whether they mind or not.
    The other thing is that members of the right-wing victim culture don't want to take responsibility for the effects of their actions on other people, so making people take responsibility for the effects of their actions is coercion. On the other hand, they don't expect to ever be forced to consent to a contract under duress, so they think that there's nothing wrong with forcing someone to consent under duress: they're perfectly happy to say that things are morally acceptable if they would never happen to someone in their circumstances.

  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Dave W Then please feel free to go ahead and answer it - for yourself, not in terms of what "supporters of contract theories would probably" do. How and when did you give consen t to be coerced in the form of a promise you are morally obliged to keep?

    In many respects I can hardly improve on Dafyd's response 10.27.

    Respecting your challenge regarding non-assent to the original bargain, can I refer you to my remark: "Supporters of contract theories would probably suggest that functioning liberal democracies are in a constant state of constitutional bargaining and their functioning rests on implicit consent"? The UK constitution, for example, has changed substantially from the settlement that which emerged 1689-1707, ditto the evolution of the US constitution from that negotiated after independence. Thus, consent is continually being implicitly endorsed by each generation.

    Regarding my own position, I think the contract theorists, especially Hobbes, have a great deal to offer to our understanding of what political societies are about. On the other hand, I agree with Aristotle that "man is by nature a political [or social] animal", so that government at root is less an invention of human beings than their natural state i.e. a state of nature for humans is to be governed. Perhaps contract theories help us to make the choice of how we wish to experience government. Over to you, Dave.


  • Dafyd wrote: »
    Just because it's 17th century doesn't mean it's been superseded. (Newton has been expanded but not superseded.)

    Eh, I'm going to pick a nit with this. Newton has definitely been superseded. It's just that his equations of motion are a working approximation of relativistic ones for low-speed, macro-level objects. General relativity was proved in 1919, over a century ago.

    I don't know where that leads your analogy, but we've had many layers of legal practice and philosophy since the 1600s. If something from then hasn't been superseded by subsequent thought, then you're going to need to make a strong case for it.
  • DafydDafyd Shipmate
    Doc Tor wrote: »
    Dafyd wrote: »
    Just because it's 17th century doesn't mean it's been superseded. (Newton has been expanded but not superseded.)
    Newton has definitely been superseded. It's just that his equations of motion are a working approximation of relativistic ones for low-speed, macro-level objects. General relativity was proved in 1919, over a century ago.
    I view general relativity as being for practical and for pedagogical purposes and from a historical perspective an expansion to the Newtonian foundation. It's a correction to Newton when dealing with velocities that are a non-negligible fraction of c, rather than something Einstein built from scratch.

    Absolutely nobody is going to use general relativity for any practical purpose in any circumstance that Newtonian physics will handle.

    As for Locke and Hobbes: undergraduate courses on political philosophy in the Anglophone world introduce problems of political legitimacy with extracts from Locke and Hobbes. They're still the people who set out the basic problems as seen within Anglophone philosophy. Even people who think the framework is mistaken have to subvert the framework rather than just do without it.
    (STEM supremacists may think that there's something wrong with this: the STEM supremacist approach gives us Dominic Cummings.)
  • Dave WDave W Shipmate
    Kwesi wrote: »
    Dave W Then please feel free to go ahead and answer it - for yourself, not in terms of what "supporters of contract theories would probably" do. How and when did you give consent to be coerced in the form of a promise you are morally obliged to keep?

    In many respects I can hardly improve on Dafyd's response 10.27.
    Sure, because of course individuals practically never actually give consent in a form concrete enough to be reasonably characterized as a promise that one might feel morally obliged to keep. All we're left with is this "implicit consent" supposedly given by people who don't know that's what's supposed to be happening and who don't have any alternative in any case - I'm pretty confident those are not characteristics of actual contracts that would stand up in court. The idea that a political settlement is a contract is a weak analogy at best, and certainly can't stand the load of moral obligation to accept coercion that you're trying to lay upon it.
  • Dafyd wrote: »
    Doc Tor wrote: »
    Dafyd wrote: »
    Just because it's 17th century doesn't mean it's been superseded. (Newton has been expanded but not superseded.)
    Newton has definitely been superseded. It's just that his equations of motion are a working approximation of relativistic ones for low-speed, macro-level objects. General relativity was proved in 1919, over a century ago.
    (STEM supremacists may think that there's something wrong with this: the STEM supremacist approach gives us Dominic Cummings.)

    Cummings can't tell actual STEM from fakery, at least partly because he has no training in any of them. Actual STEM supremacy is what gets you Merkel in charge, not Cummings.
  • Dafyd wrote: »
    Doc Tor wrote: »
    Dafyd wrote: »
    Just because it's 17th century doesn't mean it's been superseded. (Newton has been expanded but not superseded.)
    Newton has definitely been superseded. It's just that his equations of motion are a working approximation of relativistic ones for low-speed, macro-level objects. General relativity was proved in 1919, over a century ago.
    I view general relativity as being for practical and for pedagogical purposes and from a historical perspective an expansion to the Newtonian foundation. It's a correction to Newton when dealing with velocities that are a non-negligible fraction of c, rather than something Einstein built from scratch.

    Absolutely nobody is going to use general relativity for any practical purpose in any circumstance that Newtonian physics will handle.

    Your logic leads me to believe that you're a proponent of a geocentric solar system, given that only wonks need to worry about a heliocentric system.

    You're obviously and painfully wrong, and honestly, Newton himself would disagree with you. And because you treat my area of knowledge with such a cavalier attitude, I'm going to have to take anything you assert about yours with a very large pinch of salt.
  • Dafyd wrote: »
    It's a correction to Newton when dealing with velocities that are a non-negligible fraction of c, rather than something Einstein built from scratch.

    ...or gravitational fields. You can demonstrate the effect of gravity on time for yourself with some off-the-shelf clocks and a mountain.
  • DafydDafyd Shipmate
    edited October 2020
    Doc Tor wrote: »
    Dafyd wrote: »
    Absolutely nobody is going to use general relativity for any practical purpose in any circumstance that Newtonian physics will handle.
    And because you treat my area of knowledge with such a cavalier attitude, I'm going to have to take anything you assert about yours with a very large pinch of salt.
    I am probably not expressing myself very well, since I don't know what you think I'm saying but I don't think it's what I think I'm saying.

  • DafydDafyd Shipmate
    Actual STEM supremacy is what gets you Merkel in charge, not Cummings.
    I think that's the difference between a background in STEM without STEM-supremacy, and STEM-supremacy.

  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Shipmates, I think we're in danger of disappearing into a black hole. Can we just say that the ideas of Hobbes and Locke are still live despite their longevity? Of course, one might want to argue otherwise.
  • Dave W wrote: »
    Kwesi wrote: »
    Dave W Then please feel free to go ahead and answer it - for yourself, not in terms of what "supporters of contract theories would probably" do. How and when did you give consent to be coerced in the form of a promise you are morally obliged to keep?

    In many respects I can hardly improve on Dafyd's response 10.27.
    Sure, because of course individuals practically never actually give consent in a form concrete enough to be reasonably characterized as a promise that one might feel morally obliged to keep. All we're left with is this "implicit consent" supposedly given by people who don't know that's what's supposed to be happening and who don't have any alternative in any case - I'm pretty confident those are not characteristics of actual contracts that would stand up in court. The idea that a political settlement is a contract is a weak analogy at best, and certainly can't stand the load of moral obligation to accept coercion that you're trying to lay upon it.

    The last time I remember seeing the concept of implicit consent in a legal context it was a sex assault case where a lower court had held that the complainant had implicitly consented to sex by wearing a very short skirt. You may be relieved to learn that the Supreme Court of Canada held otherwise.
    Dafyd wrote: »
    One can implicitly assume an obligation by acting as if you accept it. (I assume there is some body of legal rulings as to what it is reasonable to take as implicit acceptance.)

    There is obviously a sense in which we create contracts implictly all the time. If I take a ticket and park my car in a public parking garage I've just entered into a contract with the garage owner - I don't need to meet with one of their representatives and sign a document first. But that works because certain specific acts are widely understand as having certain meanings - in this case, my acceptance of an offer thereby creating a contract. But I don't think there is anything like a general doctrine of implicit acceptance of obligations in law. If my neighbor shows up every time it snows to shovel my driveway this winter I may owe him gratitude, but the fact that I didn't tell him to go away the first time he showed up doesn't entitle him to send me a bill for driveway clearing services come Spring. There needs to be a meeting of minds that he is offering a service that I have agreed to pay for.

    I think the idea of a social contract may be helpful heuristically but like Dave W I am skeptical about its ability to ground a strong sense of moral obligation.
  • DafydDafyd Shipmate
    Kwesi wrote: »
    Shipmates, I think we're in danger of disappearing into a black hole. Can we just say that the ideas of Hobbes and Locke are still live despite their longevity?
    My fault for introducing an incomprehensible analogy.

    Anyway, Hobbes and Locke have considerable differences between them.
    You seem to agree with Hobbes, who believed that having accepted government the society has promised to accept every edict that government might issue.
    Locke on the other hand argues that one consents only in so far as the government is acting in the collective interest, and that anything that the government does that's not in the collective interest is illegitimate.

  • KwesiKwesi Shipmate
    Dafyd: Anyway, Hobbes and Locke have considerable differences between them.

    Agreed.

    Hobbes view of the state of nature is that it is "the war of every man against everyman" that rendered a civilised and productive economy impossible. He also held that what men most feared was "violent death". (This reflected his own psychological condition: "fear and I were twins"). He, therefore, recommend that citizens agree (contract) to be ruled by Leviathan, "a mortal God", who would exercise autocratic power and guarantee their freedom from violent death. Although they agree to "accept every edict", as you say, there is the (implied?) proviso that if he fails to protect the citizens from violent death the contract is voided.

    Locke's view of the state of nature appears more benign than that of Hobbes in that it was one in which individuals enjoyed natural rights. There were, however, some who spoilt social harmony by infringing those rights, and the problem could only be solved by the formation of a state to ensure that those natural rights, especially to private property, were enforced. If the state infringed those rights then the contract was broken and citizens had the right to rebel. It was a theory of limited government, and has its expression in the US Bill of Rights, defended by a Supreme Court of Lawyers accountable only to themselves. The right of rebellion does not lie in a failure to promote the collective interest but in a failure to preserve the natural rights exercised in the state of nature. Those rights, especially in relation to property, may be against the public good.
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