First the assertion that coercion is immoral. Then the reverse to claiming that coercion can be moral if it's the minimum necessary. Which sounds a lot like claiming that coercion is wrong except for when I want it to happen, at which point it's okay and minimal.
I'm suggesting that within an ethic based on consent, coercion and wrongness are much the same thing.
And if the choice is A or B, then within such an ethic whichever option involves least coercion is the moral choice.
You may well think that such an ethic is inadequate - if so, saying why would be a constructive response.
But attacking the notion of minimal coercion as subjective makes no sense. Of course if you're OK about doing something then you don't need coercing to do it...
And if the choice is A or B, then within such an ethic whichever option involves least coercion is the moral choice.
You may well think that such an ethic is inadequate - if so, saying why would be a constructive response.
Because it's quite pointless talking about coercion choices in such abstract terms. You can't assess the appropriate level of coercion until you've identified what it is you're actually trying to achieve with the coercion.
Sure, choice A might be less coercive than choice B. But if choice A doesn't actually prevent something that you've decided you want to prevent, or induce a behaviour that you want to occur, then choice A is useless.
And half the time this is the kind of calculus actually involved, with people doing different cost-benefit analyses depending on the degree to which they value the benefit of actually achieving some goal compared to the different coercive costs.
We've all been literally living through such questions during 2020. How much are you willing to deal with lockdowns and isolation in order to reduce Covid-19 cases and the death toll from those cases. There's no point in talking about the degree of coercion involved in various degrees of lockdown without also considering what the purpose of the lockdown is.
Is having a less restrictive lockdown, or no lockdown at all, the moral choice? Well that's easy to answer so long as you completely ignore the benefits that a lockdown is supposed to bring and only look at the degree of coercion.
Russ: I'm suggesting that within an ethic based on consent, coercion and wrongness are much the same thing.
And if the choice is A or B, then within such an ethic whichever option involves least coercion is the moral choice.
I think the notion that somehow coercion is morally objectionable and that the greater the coercion the more immoral it becomes is somehow false. For example, it seems banal to suggest that the near absence of any coercion needed to secure compliance with a legal requirement to drive on a particular side of the road is somehow more morally justified or noble than a requirement to comply with a more contentious speed limit. It might also be the case that a more contentious tax regime is more morally preferable than one raising fewer objections. It's just that society has to make collective decisions some of which are more disputed than others.
The case for low levels of coercion rest less on morality than on utilitarian social theory: that willing obedience is less costly than the need to enforce compliance.
The case for low levels of coercion rest less on morality than on utilitarian social theory: that willing obedience is less costly than the need to enforce compliance.
Of course, that tells us nothing about whether compliance with any particular law is actually the right thing to do. A case could potentially be made that the higher the amount of coercion required to enforce compliance, the less likely it is that compliance is the right thing to do.
Marvin the Martian Of course, that tells us nothing about whether compliance with any particular law is actually the right thing to do.
I thoroughly agree, which was why I placed the comment in a utilitarian context.
Marvin the Martian A case could potentially be made that the higher the amount of coercion required to enforce compliance, the less likely it is that compliance is the right thing to do.
I think that would mostly be so, though recognising that "less likely" is not "invariably". You maxim would seem particularly apt when applied to a well functioning democracy, where, due to a high level of trust in government, citizens have a high level of tolerance towards somewhat unpalatable instructions.
half the time this is the kind of calculus actually involved, with people doing different cost-benefit analyses depending on the degree to which they value the benefit of actually achieving some goal compared to the different coercive costs.
Cost-benefit analysis can be really useful for managing complex systems (*). But it only has anything to do with morality within a utilitarian perspective.
If that's where you're coming from, fine. If you're an out-and-out utilitarian who thinks Golden Rule morality is for infants, just say so.
Would you shoot anyone showing symptoms of covid if the cost-benefit analysis showed that this was best for everyone in the long run ? Or is there actually some sense in which it is meaningful to say that this would be wrong and you shouldn't do it regardless of how beneficial the consequences ?
The cost-benefit analysis I'm familiar with uses trade-off values. Ask a thousand people a series of stated preference questions in which they choose which outcome they'd prefer as the costs or likelihoods vary. Would you rather run a 5% risk of getting the disease with a 10% chance that it's serious, or a 35% chance of losing your job with a guaranteed loss of your social and religious life for a year ? And then vary the %s and see at what point people switch.
If you're an out-and-out utilitarian who thinks Golden Rule morality is for infants, just say so.
I'm not sure how excluding people from bars or shops on the basis of the manager's beliefs about their ethnicity is compatible with the Golden Rule. Or indeed, with the view that an employer can take advantage of a potential employee's need for cash in hand to negotiate wages down. Seems to me you're piously invoking the Golden Rule to claim the moral high ground. While basing the actual content of your moral code on something else...
Besides which I don't think utilitarianism is incompatible with the Golden Rule. If one believes one should make decisions based on the rational pay-off in terms of happiness, so accepting the risk of a loss if that maximises the mean expected pay-off, then one wants to live in a society lived along utilitarian lines, as that maximises one's mean expected pay-off. (That goes double for someone who believes that employers shouldn't have to observe health and safety regulations if they can get their employees to sign up anyway.) If I object to utilitarianism it's not because it violates the golden rule, but because the underlying model of economic rationality is flawed.
It's just that society has to make collective decisions some of which are more disputed than others.
That's true.
But the existence of some necessary collective decisions does not imply that all collective decisions are necessary. That logic is obviously false.
The choice between dealing with some issue by a collective decision and dealing with it by individual decisions will in many cases be a disputed choice. That's part of what we're arguing about here.
Such a choice is not exempt from morality just because some collective decisions are necessary. However much those who favour collective decisions would like it to consider it so.
half the time this is the kind of calculus actually involved, with people doing different cost-benefit analyses depending on the degree to which they value the benefit of actually achieving some goal compared to the different coercive costs.
Cost-benefit analysis can be really useful for managing complex systems (*). But it only has anything to do with morality within a utilitarian perspective.
If that's where you're coming from, fine. If you're an out-and-out utilitarian who thinks Golden Rule morality is for infants, just say so.
Would you shoot anyone showing symptoms of covid if the cost-benefit analysis showed that this was best for everyone in the long run ? Or is there actually some sense in which it is meaningful to say that this would be wrong and you shouldn't do it regardless of how beneficial the consequences ?
The cost-benefit analysis I'm familiar with uses trade-off values. Ask a thousand people a series of stated preference questions in which they choose which outcome they'd prefer as the costs or likelihoods vary. Would you rather run a 5% risk of getting the disease with a 10% chance that it's serious, or a 35% chance of losing your job with a guaranteed loss of your social and religious life for a year ? And then vary the %s and see at what point people switch.
I've not seen any such survey....
This bears so little resemblance to any sensible reading of what the rest of us are talking about that I'm not going to bother responding to it directly.
Your conception of what coercion is is utterly childish. Most "coercion" is not done to you, Russ. It's telling you your obligations towards the rest of society around you, with some consequences thrown in to encourage you towards that behaviour.
It's basically telling you not to be a selfish little bastard - something that in fact you ought to be able to work out from the Golden Rule, but we seem to live in a world where an awful lot of people have to be explicitly told not to be selfish little bastards, otherwise they'll just go ahead and be selfish little bastards.
So yeah, it'd be lovely if people figured out not to kill each other from the Golden Rule, without a criminal offence to "coerce" them. It'd be lovely if various shonky businesses didn't need penalties to encourage them to avoid selling defective products or being misleading in advertising, but apparently some business people will focus entirely on getting as much money as possible for as little effort unless you "coerce" them with laws about product standards and avoiding danger and not lying.
It'd be fantastic if the Golden Rule led people to conclude that the right thing to do would be to not contaminate things with lead. But you know what? We have laws with penalties for contaminating things with lead, because people apparently CANNOT work out that it's not nice to contaminate someone else's things with lead, lest they contaminate your stuff with lead in return.
I honestly can't imagine whether as a child you challenged every instruction your parents ever gave you. But they gave you a lot of those instructions for the basic reason that you had to be told the right thing to do, because you didn't have the Golden Rule built in to your psyche.
We wouldn't need lockdowns, quarantine and the like, if people actually just fucking listened to health advice and tried to follow the Golden Rule in trying to avoid passing on a fatal disease to other people, on the basis that they wouldn't want to be given a fatal disease themselves if the positions were reversed. We have lockdowns, quarantine and the like because too many people are either too fucking selfish or too fucking stupid to wash their hands and physically distance.
This bears so little resemblance to any sensible reading of what the rest of us are talking about that I'm not going to bother responding to it directly.
You introduced the term "cost-benefit analysis", to which I responded. Maybe you don't mean CBA, but only studies into the most effective means of achieving public health goals ?
Your conception of what coercion is is utterly childish.
Then I can look forward to reading your well-thought-out adult analysis...
Your examples are of laws against various deeds that are morally wrong ( in Golden Rule terms). You think such laws are a good thing, and I'm not disagreeing.
Is your adult argument that because coercion is sometimes justified that coercion cannot be wrong-in-itself ?
There was mention of "social contract" theories, which I understand to mean the notion that people implicitly consent to live under such laws (and to pay through taxation for the enforcement of such laws) in return for the impartial enforcement of such laws against others who might wrong them.
And that this implicit consent justifies the coercion involved, which would otherwise be itself a wrong.
In a democratic nation we consent to the laws that govern us by means of electing people to decide what they will be. There is literally no law that can't be introduced (or repealed) if enough people want it.
Coercion is an inescapable fact of life whether there is a formally constituted state or not. Hobbes understood that where there is no government the worst kind of coercion takes place: "the war of every man against everyman", in which the more personally advantaged in various ways sate their appetites on the weak, and the comforts of civilisation are denied, so that life is. "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Only under an agreed constitution, however, authoritarian, is it possible to have the order necessary to improve life, and the amount of violence in a state of nature significantly reduced. In liberal democracies the exercise of violent coercive power is significantly less. The idea that somehow the use or threat of coercion under the rule of law is an immoral imposition seems to me just daft. I think Rousseau's notion of being "forced to be free" is dangerous nonsense, but when I read some of RussRuss' posts I begin to think that enemy of the open society might have had a point.
In liberal democracies the exercise of violent coercive power is significantly less.
I believe you. The point is that you think this a good thing.
But some here seem curiously resistant to the corollary that a more-liberal less-coercive state is an even better thing.
The idea that somehow the use or threat of coercion under the rule of law is an immoral imposition seems to me just daft.
Godwin forgive me, I think the notion of judging the Third Reich by how far its atrocities were constitutional ("according to the rule of law") is just daft.
If you think there are good laws and bad laws then you have some standard by which to judge.
Russ: Godwin forgive me, I think the notion of judging the Third Reich by how far its atrocities were constitutional ("according to the rule of law") is just daft.
I'm not sure what point you are trying to make. If you are arguing that the Third Reich operated under the "Rule of Law" then I would disagree, as would many others. I fear I need you to make your point more explicit before engaging with it, assuming that's what we're being invited to do.
Russ: If you think there are good laws and bad laws then you have some standard by which to judge.
Are you referring to constitutional laws or other laws? Respecting other laws, given the heterogeneity of view in almost any society, there will clearly be differences of opinion as to what constitute good or bad laws. The skill of constitution-makers is to devise processes of enactment and enforcement that enable laws to command legitimate support even when they are contentious on all sorts of grounds.
Russ: Godwin forgive me, I think the notion of judging the Third Reich by how far its atrocities were constitutional ("according to the rule of law") is just daft.
I'm not sure what point you are trying to make. If you are arguing that the Third Reich operated under the "Rule of Law" then I would disagree, as would many others. I fear I need you to make your point more explicit before engaging with it, assuming that's what we're being invited to do.
Sorry, Kwesi. I'm saying I find it mind-boggling that anyone could think that shipping 6 million people off to death camps is somehow OK if it's done by the legitimate government in accordance with whatever constitution is operative at the time.
Whether or not the executive of the Nazi government acted in accordance with the laws passed by the legislature of the Nazi state is not the determining factor in the morality of their actions.
Legal and moral are not the same thing, and the state is not exempt from moral imperatives.
And if you agree with me in the case of big evils then I don't know you can think differently when it comes to small evils. Without being a utilitarian who thinks that small evils can be justified by a greater good. In which case it makes perfect sense.
Is it really hard to spot that the problem with the Nazis is that they murdered millions of people, not that some of the people doing the murdering were coerced rather than volunteers? The evil is not in the coercion it's in the cold blooded murder.
A better example to consider might be Cuban doctors. They're treated much like military conscripts and in the so doing have saved literally millions of lives across the world.
An example I would wish to make, Arethosemyfeet, is that of the UK "Community Charge", commonly known as the Poll Tax.
Many people considered it immoral but paid up because it was recognised as having been properly enacted. Some refused to pay the tax on moral grounds, but were prepared to take the consequences, even to the point of imprisonment, because they recognised an overarching general principle that the law ought to be obeyed. The Labour Party did not encourage non-payment for although its members held the law to be immoral it recognised that it would invite the Conservatives to act similarly towards laws a future Labour government might introduce.
. Russ: Legal and moral are not the same thing, and the state is not exempt from moral imperatives.
And if you agree with me in the case of big evils then I don't know you can think differently when it comes to small evils. Without being a utilitarian who thinks that small evils can be justified by a greater good. In which case it makes perfect sense.
Russ seeks to diminish the importance of legality arising from due process in the name of morality. Liberal democracies, however, recognise that the citizens have differing views as to what is moral and what isn't, and by placing emphasis on the rule of law and due process, seek to accommodate a diversity of opinion, moral otherwise. Where citizens agree to those processes the laws themselves are inevitably moral compromises, which some may consider immoral, but opponents obey those laws and recognise the right of the state to enforce them because experience indicates the claims of process is a greater good, not least the costs and methods of enforcement. Russ regards small moral compromises in resulting laws (small evils) as no more acceptable than greater ones. I disagree. There is great wisdom in rendering to the Caesar what is his, but there is a point where rebellion against a tyrannical democracy is an imperative in the name of 'God', though I'm struggling for an example. I guess Russ
regards morality more important than good government.
There is great wisdom in rendering to the Caesar what is his, but there is a point where rebellion against a tyrannical democracy is an imperative in the name of 'God', though I'm struggling for an example.
You may be right. What I'm asking you to admit is that in taking that view you're employing a notion of morality in which good and evil are quantified and traded off. As against a notion of morality based on commandments which should be obeyed by everybody in all things large and small.
I guess Russ
regards morality more important than good government.
Ah the joys of the English language in which words like "good" have multiple meanings. I assume you don't mean morally-good government. Or good meaning the forms and methods of government which you happen to subjectively like.
I guess you mean good in the sense of government which effectively and efficiently fulfils the functions of a government
(defence of the realm, facilitating trade by issuing sound currency, etc etc) ?
Where citizens agree to those processes the laws themselves are inevitably moral compromises, which some may consider immoral, but opponents obey those laws and recognise the right of the state to enforce them because experience indicates the claims of process is a greater good, not least the costs and methods of enforcement.
The liberal tradition, and older - the scholastic philosophers would agree - has it that there comes a point at which the law becomes sufficiently unjust as to no longer have a claim upon our obedience.
There are two reasons one might reach that point. The first is if the law sufficiently bears down an person's rights as to treat them worse than one might suppose them to be in the state of nature or else treat them as no longer part of the political community. The second is if the law seeks to make itself impossible to reform peacefully.
Politics is generally a compromise or negotiation between different people's interests where those interests are at least apparently in conflict. It is therefore possible to believe that the present state of things resolves those conflicts incorrectly, and therefore immorally, without thinking it so unjust as to forfeit obedience. However, there comes a point the resolution eats sufficiently far into not merely people's interests but their ability to perform some activity central to leading a good life, and then it becomes so unjust as to forfeit obedience.
Examples: any law banning worship where that worship is not directly injurious to others; laws enabling slavery or requiring the return of escaped slaves; laws banning sexual activity between consenting and non-vulnerable adults, especially where those laws discriminate against certain sexual preferences, again where not injurious to others; laws forbidding basic human charities and assistance to those in need. Likewise laws, such as apartheid laws or laws restricting the voting rights of a section of a population, that treat part of the population as being less than full members of the community deserve less than full obedience.
The second category is laws that restrict freedom of speech, freedom of criticise or make representation to the government, or that restrict political participation to only part of the population. Since these make it impossible to seek lawful remedies for hardships endured or to alter the balance of interests peacefully, they make recourse to unlawful remedies permissible.
Russ: You may be right. What I'm asking you to admit is that in taking that view you're employing a notion of morality in which good and evil are quantified and traded off. As against a notion of morality based on commandments which should be obeyed by everybody in all things large and small.
In your terms I'm not unhappy to admit what you wish, though I don't see it as a problem, because what you seem to be advocating is the rule of Ayatollahs, and all that implies. Politics, IMO, should not be about imposing a particular moral code, but the art of promoting a consensus as to what might necessarily be, therefore, a compromised view of the common good. From a Christian perspective, Jesus distinguished between things large and small, being prepared to break the sabbath laws which God gave to Moses when it came to healing and assuaging his hunger and that of the disciples, but was prepared to go to
the cross for more essential considerations. Jesus was also of the opinion that while the principle of divorce was wrong Moses thought it prudent not to press it in certain circumstances. Morality should never get in the way of compassion. I'm not so concerned about the morality of politicians as their degree compassion for suffering humanity. Perhaps what's wrong with politics at the present time is a distinct lack compassion in so many leaders.
It is possible for the State to have legitimate authority to compel you to do many things, without it therefore being obligatory to obey the State "whatever it says". This is very much the New Testament position, where the apostles are prepared to obey the Roman state except where so doing would conflict with their obligations to God.
That's seems a logical position, insomuch as it takes a specific understanding of what the revealed will of God is, and treats obedience to that will as the highest value.
Those who don't believe in revelation, but believe in some notion of objective morality, could take a similar view. That within the bounds of what is moral, we are prepared to abide by what the state decrees, but not beyond. (Whether one sees morality as written by God on the human heart, or doesn't believe in God at all).
The difference being that we cannot point to any external text that defines how far the state may go, but only to widely-accepted moral principles.
Which you may think works ?But maybe only if such principles are clearly distinct from personal political convictions ?
Or is the state necessarily a thing that cannot tolerate any limit being placed on its authority ?
I think the state cannot by necessity be such a thing, otherwise God would not approve of its existence. Whereas it seems clear to me that scripture, tradition and reason endorse the legitimate role of the state.
I find it very striking that St. Paul is so positive about the Roman state even though (if I am not mistaken) he was writing in the time of Nero.
I think the state cannot by necessity be a thing that tolerates no limits on its authority, otherwise God would not approve of its existence. Whereas it seems clear to me that scripture, tradition and reason endorse the legitimate role of the state.
I find it very striking that St. Paul is so positive about the Roman state even though (if I am not mistaken) he was writing in the time of Nero.
Sorry double post and cannot work out how to remove - could some kind Host delete? - apologies TqT
TurquoiseTastic: I find it very striking that St. Paul is so positive about the Roman state even though (if I am not mistaken) he was writing in the time of Nero.
Remember that Paul was a Roman Citizen, an advantage that he used on more than one occasion to his advantage. His appeal to Caesar not only protected him against the Jewish religious leaders but enabled him to make his historic journey to Rome. Like Jesus, Paul recognised the realities of political power and its legitimacy, even when exercised by gentiles. It was certainly a more sensible stance than that of the zealots, whose purity led to Masada. You'd better check with Russ to see whether Paul was, thereby. a moral utilitarian or not!
As against a notion of morality based on commandments which should be obeyed by everybody in all things large and small.
Who's going to make them obey? And more pertinently, how are they going to gain compliance without any form of coercion?
There may be moral wrongs that you commit that are none of anybody else's business but are between you and God.
But you're right - if I coerce you into refraining from wrongs against me, that seems like no more than insisting on my rights.
But conversely, if I coerce you by threats into doing something for me that I have no moral right to, then it seems to me that I wrong you thereby.
Unless you've somehow consented to be so coerced.
So if I'm whinging about the state coercing me (whether about lockdown or anything else) you can answer me in one of three ways:
Either that I've a moral duty to obey the state whatever it says, because it is the morally legitimate authority.
Or that this particular thing I'm being coerced into is a moral duty.
Or that I somehow consented (to this particular coercion or to all forms of state coercion) in implicitly signing some form of social contract.
Would you agree ?
No, because I reject the notion that universal, unchanging, objective "moral duties" have any place in a democratic secular society.
You appear to me to be arguing that legal coercion is wrong except when it's done to enforce a "moral duty". Or to put it another way, you think coercion is fine when it's forcing other people to obey your morality but not when it's forcing you to obey anyone else's. I reject that, for reasons which I hope should be obvious.
That being said, I do happen to agree with your third proposed answer, as I've already stated on this thread. The implicit consent is IMO granted through the process of regular free and fair elections that enable everyone to determine who will set the laws they will have to follow.
I think the question should be when did more than one party go into a UK general election with the realistic chance of winning outright and governing alone without having to come to an arrangement with another party or parties
2017.
May thought she was on a winner, and was going to increase her majority. Labour's vote share in the polls was increasing so rapidly as the election approached, that it wouldn't have taken much to shift things to an overall Labour victory.
In the end, of course, nobody won.
Just on this one - I've been away for a few weeks so catching up - it's true that It wouldn't have taken many thousand more votes to give Labour a majority in 2017. However, I think the number of additional votes needed for a working Tory majority was ludicrously tiny - IIRC (well) below 1000....
No, because I reject the notion that universal, unchanging, objective "moral duties" have any place in a democratic secular society.
You appear to me to be arguing that legal coercion is wrong except when it's done to enforce a "moral duty". Or to put it another way, you think coercion is fine when it's forcing other people to obey your morality but not when it's forcing you to obey anyone else's. I reject that, for reasons which I hope should be obvious.
That being said, I do happen to agree with your third proposed answer, as I've already stated on this thread. The implicit consent is IMO granted through the process of regular free and fair elections that enable everyone to determine who will set the laws they will have to follow.
Seems like you're telling me that the Nuremberg trials got it wrong. That obeying the orders of the State justifies any atrocity, up to and including the killing of 6m Jews (as the paradigm example of State wrongdoing). Subject only to some condition about the government giving those orders being elected by a process that meets some standard of freeness and fairness.
I cannot agree with you. To the extent that I question whether you really mean what you say.
(Not sure whether you're arguing that such a standard is objective and culture-free).
I can see that you might deny the notion that Russ's morality is the One True Morality. But is it any better to say that Marvin's 21st-century notion of what constitutes free and fair elections justifies any act of the state ?
No, because I reject the notion that universal, unchanging, objective "moral duties" have any place in a democratic secular society.
You appear to me to be arguing that legal coercion is wrong except when it's done to enforce a "moral duty". Or to put it another way, you think coercion is fine when it's forcing other people to obey your morality but not when it's forcing you to obey anyone else's. I reject that, for reasons which I hope should be obvious.
That being said, I do happen to agree with your third proposed answer, as I've already stated on this thread. The implicit consent is IMO granted through the process of regular free and fair elections that enable everyone to determine who will set the laws they will have to follow.
Seems like you're telling me that the Nuremberg trials got it wrong. That obeying the orders of the State justifies any atrocity, up to and including the killing of 6m Jews (as the paradigm example of State wrongdoing). Subject only to some condition about the government giving those orders being elected by a process that meets some standard of freeness and fairness.
I cannot agree with you. To the extent that I question whether you really mean what you say.
(Not sure whether you're arguing that such a standard is objective and culture-free).
I can see that you might deny the notion that Russ's morality is the One True Morality. But is it any better to say that Marvin's 21st-century notion of what constitutes free and fair elections justifies any act of the state ?
Bzzt. German democracy is effectively annulled on March 23, 1933. Anything that happens after that (and honestly, quite a lot before it) fails Marvin's free and fair election test.
The question is not how much of Hitler's rise to power was through the electoral process, but whether it would have made his subsequent acts acceptable if he"d won that election "fairly".
Seems like you're telling me that the Nuremberg trials got it wrong. That obeying the orders of the State justifies any atrocity, up to and including the killing of 6m Jews (as the paradigm example of State wrongdoing). Subject only to some condition about the government giving those orders being elected by a process that meets some standard of freeness and fairness.
Hold on. Doesn't your opposition to utilitarianism mean that obedience to the state is either always right or always wrong? That it's wrong to judge the morality of actions by consequences or outcomes? In other words, doesn't your anti-utilitarianism mean that the moral obligation of obedience to the state, if such a moral obligation exists, is independent of whether or not such obedience has a negative utility (like genocide)?
The question is not how much of Hitler's rise to power was through the electoral process, but whether it would have made his subsequent acts acceptable if he"d won that election "fairly".
No, that's exactly the question (or at least this part of it). Hitler didn't stand on a platform of gassing millions of Jews, and it was neither offered as a choice to the electorate, nor put in front of a parliament of elected representatives. Of course, it wouldn't have rendered the act acceptable (to me), but it would have rendered it lawful - there would have been implicit consent. It'd be up to individuals thereafter to decide to obey or break the law.
Seems like you're telling me that the Nuremberg trials got it wrong. That obeying the orders of the State justifies any atrocity, up to and including the killing of 6m Jews (as the paradigm example of State wrongdoing). Subject only to some condition about the government giving those orders being elected by a process that meets some standard of freeness and fairness.
Hold on. Doesn't your opposition to utilitarianism mean that obedience to the state is either always right or always wrong? That it's wrong to judge the morality of actions by consequences or outcomes? In other words, doesn't your anti-utilitarianism mean that the moral obligation of obedience to the state, if such a moral obligation exists, is independent of whether or not such obedience has a negative utility (like genocide)?
No no no because there could be more than one level of moral obligation, whether you are taking a deontological or a virtue ethics position. You could argue that there are certain moral rules (such as not murdering people) which take priority over obedience to the state, which is a genuine but lesser obligation.
No no no because there could be more than one level of moral obligation, whether you are taking a deontological or a virtue ethics position. You could argue that there are certain moral rules (such as not murdering people) which take priority over obedience to the state, which is a genuine but lesser obligation.
One could argue that, but @Russ does not. He frequently expresses his disdain for the idea that it's okay to commit an otherwise immoral act (e.g. lawbreaking) in order to obtain a desirable end (e.g. preventing genocide).
I thought @Russ was saying the opposite of that - that there was no moral obligation to obey the law because it was the law but only if there were some other moral justification for it. His position seems roughly libertarian to me.
I disagree with this because I do think we are morally obliged to obey the law unless it demands something definitely immoral on other grounds.
I think that generally speaking it is a sound moral principle that one should obey the law for a variety of reasons, especially in a democratic society, though like most principles it should not be taken to obviously absurd extremes. Isn't that what most people think is the sensible way of going about things? It certainly isn't a problem with politics, rather the reverse.
I think that generally speaking it is a sound moral principle that one should obey the law for a variety of reasons, especially in a democratic society, though like most principles it should not be taken to obviously absurd extremes. Isn't that what most people think is the sensible way of going about things? It certainly isn't a problem with politics, rather the reverse.
I thought @Russ was saying the opposite of that - that there was no moral obligation to obey the law because it was the law but only if there were some other moral justification for it. His position seems roughly libertarian to me.
I disagree with this because I do think we are morally obliged to obey the law unless it demands something definitely immoral on other grounds.
There is a standard moral justification for obeying most laws: trying to get along with people around you as part of society instead of being a completely individualistic arsehole.
What is a moral act? One answer, which I'd agree with, is that it is an action in a particular society which conforms to the mores of that society. That approach is basically what Orfeo is saying.
.
What is a moral act? One answer, which I'd agree with, is that it is an action in a particular society which conforms to the mores of that society.
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The Christian tradition is that morality is from God. Moses bringing the commandments down from the holy mountain and all that.
So your notion can be seen as part of a modern view that dethrones God and puts society in His place.
And if morality is conforming to society, then seeking to change society (i.e. politics) is either inherently immoral, or else a sphere that is above morality. Politics is engagement in deciding what society is going to be, necessarily unconstrained by what it currently is.
So in that view, Hitler was either above questions of right and wrong, or immoral in the same way that every politician is.
Hitler didn't stand on a platform of gassing millions of Jews, and it was neither offered as a choice to the electorate, nor put in front of a parliament of elected representatives. Of course, it wouldn't have rendered the act acceptable (to me), but it would have rendered it lawful - there would have been implicit consent.
Whether Hitler's acts were lawful is a question of interpreting the Weimar constitution.
Which is a separate question from how far they conform to our 21st century Anglosphere ideas of good governance.
That "to me" is interesting. Seems like you want to state that the Holocaust was an unacceptable act. Then feel you have to downgrade that to a statement of your personal feelings on the matter. As if the illegality of Hitler's regime is a public truth but the moral wrongness of the acts of that regime are no more than a private belief of no more weight than your political opinions.
But we are talking of morality in a civil, not religious, context.
I find within the Christian tradition the notion that the commandments are of two types. Those like the prohibition on murder, that are considered binding on everyone, Christian and pagan alike. And those like the moral duty of sabbath-keeping, which are a matter only of the relationship between God and his followers, which unbelievers can dismiss as none of their concern. (As Pilate asks, "Am I a Jew ?")
We expect the pagans and the atheists to refrain from murder, not on the authority of a revelation which they reject, but because it is self-evidently right.
And part of what we're arguing about here is whether that category, of actions or choices that are morally right or wrong in a way that is objective or above culture, exists or is a philosophical error.
There are undoubtedly cultural mores; you're suggesting that morality is nothing but mores. There are legal systems; Doc Tor is I think suggesting that there is no objective basis on which to condemn the Holocaust outside of the legal system of 1930s Germany.
Are you truly content that there is no stronger condemnation you can make of any atrocity than to say that in our culture we don't do that ?
If the category isn't meaningful, there's no point arguing about what should be in it...
the moral wrongness of the acts of that regime are no more than a private belief of no more weight than your political opinions.
You seem to be implying that your moral opinions have more weight than other people's political opinions.
One of your irregular verbs:
Russ' opinions are moral.
Other people's opinions are merely political.
Therefore, Russ' opinions about the limits of government are moral and should have more weight than other people's merely political and private opinions about the limits of government.
The Christian tradition is that morality is from God. Moses bringing the commandments down from the holy mountain and all that.
So your notion can be seen as part of a modern view that dethrones God and puts society in His place.
And if morality is conforming to society, then seeking to change society (i.e. politics) is either inherently immoral, or else a sphere that is above morality. Politics is engagement in deciding what society is going to be, necessarily unconstrained by what it currently is.
I'm not sure I buy @Russ' implication that Christians don't form social units, or socialize with each other, or form what could be considered a "society".
The other implication is that a socially-derived moral system is bad because it requires unthinking obedience, whereas a religiously-derived moral system (and religion apparently exists apart from and outside of society) is good because it comes from God and therefore requires unthinking obedience. This doesn't really seem like much of a distinction.
To take a more concrete example, if someone believes race-mixing is immoral because of their Christian beliefs, that's moral because it comes from God, whereas it would be immoral to believe that because of social norms. To an outsider that seems like using religion as a "get out of accountability" card.
So in that view, Hitler was either above questions of right and wrong, or immoral in the same way that every politician is.
Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.
- Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
And the founder of Christianity made no secret indeed of his estimation of the Jewish people. When He found it necessary, He drove those enemies of the human race out of the Temple of God.
- Adolf Hitler, also Mein Kampf
So your claim is that if Hitler's actions were justified by religious belief instead of "society", that makes them moral?
Or is it that when Martin Luther proposed the Holocaust it was moral (because Christianity!) but when Adolf Hitler implemented it that was immoral (because "society"). I'm afraid I'm not parsing that distinction.
Comments
Too cynical, @Croesos.
I'm suggesting that within an ethic based on consent, coercion and wrongness are much the same thing.
And if the choice is A or B, then within such an ethic whichever option involves least coercion is the moral choice.
You may well think that such an ethic is inadequate - if so, saying why would be a constructive response.
But attacking the notion of minimal coercion as subjective makes no sense. Of course if you're OK about doing something then you don't need coercing to do it...
Because it's quite pointless talking about coercion choices in such abstract terms. You can't assess the appropriate level of coercion until you've identified what it is you're actually trying to achieve with the coercion.
Sure, choice A might be less coercive than choice B. But if choice A doesn't actually prevent something that you've decided you want to prevent, or induce a behaviour that you want to occur, then choice A is useless.
And half the time this is the kind of calculus actually involved, with people doing different cost-benefit analyses depending on the degree to which they value the benefit of actually achieving some goal compared to the different coercive costs.
We've all been literally living through such questions during 2020. How much are you willing to deal with lockdowns and isolation in order to reduce Covid-19 cases and the death toll from those cases. There's no point in talking about the degree of coercion involved in various degrees of lockdown without also considering what the purpose of the lockdown is.
Is having a less restrictive lockdown, or no lockdown at all, the moral choice? Well that's easy to answer so long as you completely ignore the benefits that a lockdown is supposed to bring and only look at the degree of coercion.
I think the notion that somehow coercion is morally objectionable and that the greater the coercion the more immoral it becomes is somehow false. For example, it seems banal to suggest that the near absence of any coercion needed to secure compliance with a legal requirement to drive on a particular side of the road is somehow more morally justified or noble than a requirement to comply with a more contentious speed limit. It might also be the case that a more contentious tax regime is more morally preferable than one raising fewer objections. It's just that society has to make collective decisions some of which are more disputed than others.
The case for low levels of coercion rest less on morality than on utilitarian social theory: that willing obedience is less costly than the need to enforce compliance.
Of course, that tells us nothing about whether compliance with any particular law is actually the right thing to do. A case could potentially be made that the higher the amount of coercion required to enforce compliance, the less likely it is that compliance is the right thing to do.
I thoroughly agree, which was why I placed the comment in a utilitarian context.
I think that would mostly be so, though recognising that "less likely" is not "invariably". You maxim would seem particularly apt when applied to a well functioning democracy, where, due to a high level of trust in government, citizens have a high level of tolerance towards somewhat unpalatable instructions.
Cost-benefit analysis can be really useful for managing complex systems (*). But it only has anything to do with morality within a utilitarian perspective.
If that's where you're coming from, fine. If you're an out-and-out utilitarian who thinks Golden Rule morality is for infants, just say so.
Would you shoot anyone showing symptoms of covid if the cost-benefit analysis showed that this was best for everyone in the long run ? Or is there actually some sense in which it is meaningful to say that this would be wrong and you shouldn't do it regardless of how beneficial the consequences ?
The cost-benefit analysis I'm familiar with uses trade-off values. Ask a thousand people a series of stated preference questions in which they choose which outcome they'd prefer as the costs or likelihoods vary. Would you rather run a 5% risk of getting the disease with a 10% chance that it's serious, or a 35% chance of losing your job with a guaranteed loss of your social and religious life for a year ? And then vary the %s and see at what point people switch.
I've not seen any such survey....
Besides which I don't think utilitarianism is incompatible with the Golden Rule. If one believes one should make decisions based on the rational pay-off in terms of happiness, so accepting the risk of a loss if that maximises the mean expected pay-off, then one wants to live in a society lived along utilitarian lines, as that maximises one's mean expected pay-off. (That goes double for someone who believes that employers shouldn't have to observe health and safety regulations if they can get their employees to sign up anyway.) If I object to utilitarianism it's not because it violates the golden rule, but because the underlying model of economic rationality is flawed.
That's true.
But the existence of some necessary collective decisions does not imply that all collective decisions are necessary. That logic is obviously false.
The choice between dealing with some issue by a collective decision and dealing with it by individual decisions will in many cases be a disputed choice. That's part of what we're arguing about here.
Such a choice is not exempt from morality just because some collective decisions are necessary. However much those who favour collective decisions would like it to consider it so.
This bears so little resemblance to any sensible reading of what the rest of us are talking about that I'm not going to bother responding to it directly.
Your conception of what coercion is is utterly childish. Most "coercion" is not done to you, Russ. It's telling you your obligations towards the rest of society around you, with some consequences thrown in to encourage you towards that behaviour.
It's basically telling you not to be a selfish little bastard - something that in fact you ought to be able to work out from the Golden Rule, but we seem to live in a world where an awful lot of people have to be explicitly told not to be selfish little bastards, otherwise they'll just go ahead and be selfish little bastards.
So yeah, it'd be lovely if people figured out not to kill each other from the Golden Rule, without a criminal offence to "coerce" them. It'd be lovely if various shonky businesses didn't need penalties to encourage them to avoid selling defective products or being misleading in advertising, but apparently some business people will focus entirely on getting as much money as possible for as little effort unless you "coerce" them with laws about product standards and avoiding danger and not lying.
It'd be fantastic if the Golden Rule led people to conclude that the right thing to do would be to not contaminate things with lead. But you know what? We have laws with penalties for contaminating things with lead, because people apparently CANNOT work out that it's not nice to contaminate someone else's things with lead, lest they contaminate your stuff with lead in return.
I honestly can't imagine whether as a child you challenged every instruction your parents ever gave you. But they gave you a lot of those instructions for the basic reason that you had to be told the right thing to do, because you didn't have the Golden Rule built in to your psyche.
We wouldn't need lockdowns, quarantine and the like, if people actually just fucking listened to health advice and tried to follow the Golden Rule in trying to avoid passing on a fatal disease to other people, on the basis that they wouldn't want to be given a fatal disease themselves if the positions were reversed. We have lockdowns, quarantine and the like because too many people are either too fucking selfish or too fucking stupid to wash their hands and physically distance.
You introduced the term "cost-benefit analysis", to which I responded. Maybe you don't mean CBA, but only studies into the most effective means of achieving public health goals ?
Then I can look forward to reading your well-thought-out adult analysis...
Your examples are of laws against various deeds that are morally wrong ( in Golden Rule terms). You think such laws are a good thing, and I'm not disagreeing.
Is your adult argument that because coercion is sometimes justified that coercion cannot be wrong-in-itself ?
There was mention of "social contract" theories, which I understand to mean the notion that people implicitly consent to live under such laws (and to pay through taxation for the enforcement of such laws) in return for the impartial enforcement of such laws against others who might wrong them.
And that this implicit consent justifies the coercion involved, which would otherwise be itself a wrong.
Is that not it ?
I believe you. The point is that you think this a good thing.
But some here seem curiously resistant to the corollary that a more-liberal less-coercive state is an even better thing.
Godwin forgive me, I think the notion of judging the Third Reich by how far its atrocities were constitutional ("according to the rule of law") is just daft.
If you think there are good laws and bad laws then you have some standard by which to judge.
I'm not sure what point you are trying to make. If you are arguing that the Third Reich operated under the "Rule of Law" then I would disagree, as would many others. I fear I need you to make your point more explicit before engaging with it, assuming that's what we're being invited to do.
Are you referring to constitutional laws or other laws? Respecting other laws, given the heterogeneity of view in almost any society, there will clearly be differences of opinion as to what constitute good or bad laws. The skill of constitution-makers is to devise processes of enactment and enforcement that enable laws to command legitimate support even when they are contentious on all sorts of grounds.
Sorry, Kwesi. I'm saying I find it mind-boggling that anyone could think that shipping 6 million people off to death camps is somehow OK if it's done by the legitimate government in accordance with whatever constitution is operative at the time.
Whether or not the executive of the Nazi government acted in accordance with the laws passed by the legislature of the Nazi state is not the determining factor in the morality of their actions.
Legal and moral are not the same thing, and the state is not exempt from moral imperatives.
And if you agree with me in the case of big evils then I don't know you can think differently when it comes to small evils. Without being a utilitarian who thinks that small evils can be justified by a greater good. In which case it makes perfect sense.
A better example to consider might be Cuban doctors. They're treated much like military conscripts and in the so doing have saved literally millions of lives across the world.
Many people considered it immoral but paid up because it was recognised as having been properly enacted. Some refused to pay the tax on moral grounds, but were prepared to take the consequences, even to the point of imprisonment, because they recognised an overarching general principle that the law ought to be obeyed. The Labour Party did not encourage non-payment for although its members held the law to be immoral it recognised that it would invite the Conservatives to act similarly towards laws a future Labour government might introduce.
Russ seeks to diminish the importance of legality arising from due process in the name of morality. Liberal democracies, however, recognise that the citizens have differing views as to what is moral and what isn't, and by placing emphasis on the rule of law and due process, seek to accommodate a diversity of opinion, moral otherwise. Where citizens agree to those processes the laws themselves are inevitably moral compromises, which some may consider immoral, but opponents obey those laws and recognise the right of the state to enforce them because experience indicates the claims of process is a greater good, not least the costs and methods of enforcement. Russ regards small moral compromises in resulting laws (small evils) as no more acceptable than greater ones. I disagree. There is great wisdom in rendering to the Caesar what is his, but there is a point where rebellion against a tyrannical democracy is an imperative in the name of 'God', though I'm struggling for an example. I guess Russ
regards morality more important than good government.
You may be right. What I'm asking you to admit is that in taking that view you're employing a notion of morality in which good and evil are quantified and traded off. As against a notion of morality based on commandments which should be obeyed by everybody in all things large and small.
Ah the joys of the English language in which words like "good" have multiple meanings. I assume you don't mean morally-good government. Or good meaning the forms and methods of government which you happen to subjectively like.
I guess you mean good in the sense of government which effectively and efficiently fulfils the functions of a government
(defence of the realm, facilitating trade by issuing sound currency, etc etc) ?
Who's going to make them obey? And more pertinently, how are they going to gain compliance without any form of coercion?
There are two reasons one might reach that point. The first is if the law sufficiently bears down an person's rights as to treat them worse than one might suppose them to be in the state of nature or else treat them as no longer part of the political community. The second is if the law seeks to make itself impossible to reform peacefully.
Politics is generally a compromise or negotiation between different people's interests where those interests are at least apparently in conflict. It is therefore possible to believe that the present state of things resolves those conflicts incorrectly, and therefore immorally, without thinking it so unjust as to forfeit obedience. However, there comes a point the resolution eats sufficiently far into not merely people's interests but their ability to perform some activity central to leading a good life, and then it becomes so unjust as to forfeit obedience.
Examples: any law banning worship where that worship is not directly injurious to others; laws enabling slavery or requiring the return of escaped slaves; laws banning sexual activity between consenting and non-vulnerable adults, especially where those laws discriminate against certain sexual preferences, again where not injurious to others; laws forbidding basic human charities and assistance to those in need. Likewise laws, such as apartheid laws or laws restricting the voting rights of a section of a population, that treat part of the population as being less than full members of the community deserve less than full obedience.
The second category is laws that restrict freedom of speech, freedom of criticise or make representation to the government, or that restrict political participation to only part of the population. Since these make it impossible to seek lawful remedies for hardships endured or to alter the balance of interests peacefully, they make recourse to unlawful remedies permissible.
In your terms I'm not unhappy to admit what you wish, though I don't see it as a problem, because what you seem to be advocating is the rule of Ayatollahs, and all that implies. Politics, IMO, should not be about imposing a particular moral code, but the art of promoting a consensus as to what might necessarily be, therefore, a compromised view of the common good. From a Christian perspective, Jesus distinguished between things large and small, being prepared to break the sabbath laws which God gave to Moses when it came to healing and assuaging his hunger and that of the disciples, but was prepared to go to
the cross for more essential considerations. Jesus was also of the opinion that while the principle of divorce was wrong Moses thought it prudent not to press it in certain circumstances. Morality should never get in the way of compassion. I'm not so concerned about the morality of politicians as their degree compassion for suffering humanity. Perhaps what's wrong with politics at the present time is a distinct lack compassion in so many leaders.
There may be moral wrongs that you commit that are none of anybody else's business but are between you and God.
But you're right - if I coerce you into refraining from wrongs against me, that seems like no more than insisting on my rights.
But conversely, if I coerce you by threats into doing something for me that I have no moral right to, then it seems to me that I wrong you thereby.
Unless you've somehow consented to be so coerced.
So if I'm whinging about the state coercing me (whether about lockdown or anything else) you can answer me in one of three ways:
Either that I've a moral duty to obey the state whatever it says, because it is the morally legitimate authority.
Or that this particular thing I'm being coerced into is a moral duty.
Or that I somehow consented (to this particular coercion or to all forms of state coercion) in implicitly signing some form of social contract.
Would you agree ?
Those who don't believe in revelation, but believe in some notion of objective morality, could take a similar view. That within the bounds of what is moral, we are prepared to abide by what the state decrees, but not beyond. (Whether one sees morality as written by God on the human heart, or doesn't believe in God at all).
The difference being that we cannot point to any external text that defines how far the state may go, but only to widely-accepted moral principles.
Which you may think works ?But maybe only if such principles are clearly distinct from personal political convictions ?
Or is the state necessarily a thing that cannot tolerate any limit being placed on its authority ?
I find it very striking that St. Paul is so positive about the Roman state even though (if I am not mistaken) he was writing in the time of Nero.
Sorry double post and cannot work out how to remove - could some kind Host delete? - apologies TqT
Remember that Paul was a Roman Citizen, an advantage that he used on more than one occasion to his advantage. His appeal to Caesar not only protected him against the Jewish religious leaders but enabled him to make his historic journey to Rome. Like Jesus, Paul recognised the realities of political power and its legitimacy, even when exercised by gentiles. It was certainly a more sensible stance than that of the zealots, whose purity led to Masada. You'd better check with Russ to see whether Paul was, thereby. a moral utilitarian or not!
No, because I reject the notion that universal, unchanging, objective "moral duties" have any place in a democratic secular society.
You appear to me to be arguing that legal coercion is wrong except when it's done to enforce a "moral duty". Or to put it another way, you think coercion is fine when it's forcing other people to obey your morality but not when it's forcing you to obey anyone else's. I reject that, for reasons which I hope should be obvious.
That being said, I do happen to agree with your third proposed answer, as I've already stated on this thread. The implicit consent is IMO granted through the process of regular free and fair elections that enable everyone to determine who will set the laws they will have to follow.
Just on this one - I've been away for a few weeks so catching up - it's true that It wouldn't have taken many thousand more votes to give Labour a majority in 2017. However, I think the number of additional votes needed for a working Tory majority was ludicrously tiny - IIRC (well) below 1000....
Seems like you're telling me that the Nuremberg trials got it wrong. That obeying the orders of the State justifies any atrocity, up to and including the killing of 6m Jews (as the paradigm example of State wrongdoing). Subject only to some condition about the government giving those orders being elected by a process that meets some standard of freeness and fairness.
I cannot agree with you. To the extent that I question whether you really mean what you say.
(Not sure whether you're arguing that such a standard is objective and culture-free).
I can see that you might deny the notion that Russ's morality is the One True Morality. But is it any better to say that Marvin's 21st-century notion of what constitutes free and fair elections justifies any act of the state ?
Bzzt. German democracy is effectively annulled on March 23, 1933. Anything that happens after that (and honestly, quite a lot before it) fails Marvin's free and fair election test.
But you knew that, right?
Hold on. Doesn't your opposition to utilitarianism mean that obedience to the state is either always right or always wrong? That it's wrong to judge the morality of actions by consequences or outcomes? In other words, doesn't your anti-utilitarianism mean that the moral obligation of obedience to the state, if such a moral obligation exists, is independent of whether or not such obedience has a negative utility (like genocide)?
No, that's exactly the question (or at least this part of it). Hitler didn't stand on a platform of gassing millions of Jews, and it was neither offered as a choice to the electorate, nor put in front of a parliament of elected representatives. Of course, it wouldn't have rendered the act acceptable (to me), but it would have rendered it lawful - there would have been implicit consent. It'd be up to individuals thereafter to decide to obey or break the law.
No no no because there could be more than one level of moral obligation, whether you are taking a deontological or a virtue ethics position. You could argue that there are certain moral rules (such as not murdering people) which take priority over obedience to the state, which is a genuine but lesser obligation.
One could argue that, but @Russ does not. He frequently expresses his disdain for the idea that it's okay to commit an otherwise immoral act (e.g. lawbreaking) in order to obtain a desirable end (e.g. preventing genocide).
That was Russ about two weeks back, claiming there is a moral dimension to obeying the law.
I disagree with this because I do think we are morally obliged to obey the law unless it demands something definitely immoral on other grounds.
That sounds about right to me.
There is a standard moral justification for obeying most laws: trying to get along with people around you as part of society instead of being a completely individualistic arsehole.
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Gee D
The Christian tradition is that morality is from God. Moses bringing the commandments down from the holy mountain and all that.
So your notion can be seen as part of a modern view that dethrones God and puts society in His place.
And if morality is conforming to society, then seeking to change society (i.e. politics) is either inherently immoral, or else a sphere that is above morality. Politics is engagement in deciding what society is going to be, necessarily unconstrained by what it currently is.
So in that view, Hitler was either above questions of right and wrong, or immoral in the same way that every politician is.
Whether Hitler's acts were lawful is a question of interpreting the Weimar constitution.
Which is a separate question from how far they conform to our 21st century Anglosphere ideas of good governance.
That "to me" is interesting. Seems like you want to state that the Holocaust was an unacceptable act. Then feel you have to downgrade that to a statement of your personal feelings on the matter. As if the illegality of Hitler's regime is a public truth but the moral wrongness of the acts of that regime are no more than a private belief of no more weight than your political opinions.
But we are talking of morality in a civil, not religious, context.
Um, no. "Necessarily unconstrained" sounds like a free for all with no notion of the Overton window.
No mainstream political discussion of how to change society is unconstrained by the current position. It is directly informed by the current position.
I find within the Christian tradition the notion that the commandments are of two types. Those like the prohibition on murder, that are considered binding on everyone, Christian and pagan alike. And those like the moral duty of sabbath-keeping, which are a matter only of the relationship between God and his followers, which unbelievers can dismiss as none of their concern. (As Pilate asks, "Am I a Jew ?")
We expect the pagans and the atheists to refrain from murder, not on the authority of a revelation which they reject, but because it is self-evidently right.
And part of what we're arguing about here is whether that category, of actions or choices that are morally right or wrong in a way that is objective or above culture, exists or is a philosophical error.
There are undoubtedly cultural mores; you're suggesting that morality is nothing but mores. There are legal systems; Doc Tor is I think suggesting that there is no objective basis on which to condemn the Holocaust outside of the legal system of 1930s Germany.
Are you truly content that there is no stronger condemnation you can make of any atrocity than to say that in our culture we don't do that ?
If the category isn't meaningful, there's no point arguing about what should be in it...
One of your irregular verbs:
Russ' opinions are moral.
Other people's opinions are merely political.
Therefore, Russ' opinions about the limits of government are moral and should have more weight than other people's merely political and private opinions about the limits of government.
I'm not sure I buy @Russ' implication that Christians don't form social units, or socialize with each other, or form what could be considered a "society".
The other implication is that a socially-derived moral system is bad because it requires unthinking obedience, whereas a religiously-derived moral system (and religion apparently exists apart from and outside of society) is good because it comes from God and therefore requires unthinking obedience. This doesn't really seem like much of a distinction.
To take a more concrete example, if someone believes race-mixing is immoral because of their Christian beliefs, that's moral because it comes from God, whereas it would be immoral to believe that because of social norms. To an outsider that seems like using religion as a "get out of accountability" card.
So your claim is that if Hitler's actions were justified by religious belief instead of "society", that makes them moral?
Or is it that when Martin Luther proposed the Holocaust it was moral (because Christianity!) but when Adolf Hitler implemented it that was immoral (because "society"). I'm afraid I'm not parsing that distinction.