I don't think she thinks the life of contemplation really matters, that it has an elevated position with regard to political action whereas this should be reversed with contemplation being subservient to political action
The end of chapter 2, The term Vita Activa, which you cited in the previous post, suggests otherwise:
The modern reversal shares with the traditional hierarchy the assumption that the same central human preoccupation must prevail in all activities of men, since without one comprehensive principle no order could be established. This assumption is not a matter of course, and my use of the term vita activa presupposes that the concern underlying all its activities is not the same as and is neither superior nor inferior to the central concern of the vita contemplativa.
(which, weirdly in my view, encompasses action and talking as the same thing, but not thinking).
Later in the book, Arendt in effect notes the distinction that Dafyd makes about the different purposes of thinking.
The reason why Christianity, its insistence on the sacredness of life and on the duty to stay alive notwithstanding, never developed a positive labour philosophy lies in the unquestioned priority given to the vita contemplativa over all kinds of human activities. Vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam vita activa ("the life of contemplation is simply better than the life of action"), and whatever the merits of an active life might be, those of a life devoted to contemplation are "more effective and more powerful."[84]
84. Aquinas Summa Theologica ii. 2. 182. 1, 2. In his insistence on the absolute superiority of the vita contemplativa, Thomas shows a characteristic difference from Augustine, who recommends the inquisitio, aut inventio veritatis: ut in ea quisque proficiat—"inquisition or discovery of truth so that somebody may profit from it" (De civitate Dei xix. 19). But this difference is hardly more than the difference between a Christian thinker formed by Greek, and another by Roman, philosophy.
I'm definitely familiar with the worldview that "actions speak louder than words," that reflection is superfluous except insofar as it relates to deeds, but I'd also be a little skeptical of that life.
Then again, an online discussion board would probably self-select for people who are prone to reflection. It's kind of hard to do anything else here.
I can also see how contemplation can feel like a luxury to some folks. But it's a damned cruel world to live in.
The philosopher J L Austin wrote a book, How to Do Things with Words, to show that using words is an action.
He starts by looking at actions like naming a ship or giving a verdict, and then shows that the line between those kinds of actions and stating facts is a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind.
According to Hannah A, the important part about being in the Polis is the ability to think of political zingers on the hoof, as it were.
Thinking wasn't necessarily required.
That's quite a strange way to understand oratory, I suggest.
If it's a strange way to understand oratory then it may be that the strangeness is in the interpretation not the text.
As to the point about prerequisite knowledge, the purpose of the exercise I'm engaged in is to read the work on its own merits. I'm not really convinced a knowledge of Aristotle helps much in this instance.
That's an odd use of "on its own merits". I feel that if a work repeatedly refers to another text then ignoring the work to which it refers isn't reading the work on its own terms.
When Arendt says "as we know from the last lines of Antigone" it's reasonable to refer to the last lines of Antigone if Arendt could reasonably have expected her readership to know them. (Would a German philosopher have expected their audience to know Antigone...) Not that they're much help here, since they read (Fagles translation):
The mighty words of the proud are paid in full/
With mighty blows of fate, and at long last/
Those blows will teach us wisdom.
I can't say what Arendt thought the relevance was from the extract you gave; but it's clear she's not talking about political zingers on the hoof.
Given that this is Antigone, the "mighty words of the proud" are presumably Cleon's order that for the good of the polis but contrary to natural piety the "rebel" Polynices should be unburied. That is, a political action not a piece of repartee.
If Arendt is talking about Aristotle's distinction between the active life and the life of contemplation then it's reasonable to remember that Aristotle distinguishes between active deliberation and philosophical deduction, and to suppose that by "thought" Arendt may mean the latter - at least it does if Arendt makes more sense that way.
The philosopher J L Austin wrote a book, How to Do Things with Words, to show that using words is an action.
He starts by looking at actions like naming a ship or giving a verdict, and then shows that the line between those kinds of actions and stating facts is a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind.
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Then again, an online discussion board would probably self-select for people who are prone to reflection. It's kind of hard to do anything else here.
I can also see how contemplation can feel like a luxury to some folks. But it's a damned cruel world to live in.
He starts by looking at actions like naming a ship or giving a verdict, and then shows that the line between those kinds of actions and stating facts is a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind.
That's an odd use of "on its own merits". I feel that if a work repeatedly refers to another text then ignoring the work to which it refers isn't reading the work on its own terms.
When Arendt says "as we know from the last lines of Antigone" it's reasonable to refer to the last lines of Antigone if Arendt could reasonably have expected her readership to know them. (Would a German philosopher have expected their audience to know Antigone...) Not that they're much help here, since they read (Fagles translation):
The mighty words of the proud are paid in full/
With mighty blows of fate, and at long last/
Those blows will teach us wisdom.
I can't say what Arendt thought the relevance was from the extract you gave; but it's clear she's not talking about political zingers on the hoof.
Given that this is Antigone, the "mighty words of the proud" are presumably Cleon's order that for the good of the polis but contrary to natural piety the "rebel" Polynices should be unburied. That is, a political action not a piece of repartee.
If Arendt is talking about Aristotle's distinction between the active life and the life of contemplation then it's reasonable to remember that Aristotle distinguishes between active deliberation and philosophical deduction, and to suppose that by "thought" Arendt may mean the latter - at least it does if Arendt makes more sense that way.
Works for me.